AI Threat Watch

Case gtig-honestcue-gemini-loaderAI-assisted malwareWorldwide

HONESTCUE loader asks Gemini to write fresh C# second-stage code and compiles it in memory

GTIG described HONESTCUE, a downloader framework seen in late 2025 that prompts the Gemini API for a unique C# program to fetch and run a .NET payload from Discord CDN, compiling it in memory so no file touches disk.

MediumAttack using AIStatus: ContainedVerified case file

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Reported
Feb 12, 2026
Location
Worldwide
Target
Windows hosts targeted by the proof-of-concept framework
Severity
Medium
Triggered by
Unknown single actor or small group
Actor type
Criminal
Reported loss
None reported
CVE
None

What happened

GTIG described HONESTCUE, a downloader framework seen in late 2025 that prompts the Gemini API for a unique C# program to fetch and run a .NET payload from Discord CDN, compiling it in memory so no file touches disk.

Impact: Proof of concept; no confirmed victims published.

Who triggered it

Actor: Unknown single actor or small group

Attribution: GTIG assessed a single actor or small group in a testing phase.

Motive: Evasion of signature-based detection

How it happened

Attack vector: Runtime LLM code generation for just-in-time payload compilation

Root cause: Public LLM APIs provide polymorphic code on demand

Timeline

  1. HONESTCUE first observed by GTIG
  2. GTIG publishes the family in its AI Threat Tracker

Response

Google disabled associated accounts and infrastructure and tuned classifiers.

Current status: Contained

Sources (open in a new tab)

Cite this case

HONESTCUE loader asks Gemini to write fresh C# second-stage code and compiles it in memory. AI Threat Watch, case gtig-honestcue-gemini-loader, Feb 12, 2026. https://aithreat.io/cases/gtig-honestcue-gemini-loader/

Permanent link: https://aithreat.io/cases/gtig-honestcue-gemini-loader/

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